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July 1966] HONEY v. HENRY '8 FRANCHISE LEASING CORP. 801 
[64 C.2d 801; 52 Cal.Rptr. 18. 415 P.2d 8331 
[So F. No. 21908. In Bank. July 5, 1966.] 
CLARENCE HONEY, Plainti1f, Cross-defendant and Re-
spondent, V. HENRY'S FRANCHISE LEASING COR-
PORATION OF AMERICA, Defendant, Cross-complain-
ant and Appellant. 
[1] Vendor and Purchaser-Recovery of Purchaser's Payments. 
-A wilfuly defaulting vendee may recover the excess of his 
part payments over the damages caused by his breach. 
[2] Id.-Recovery of Damages by Vendor.-In quieting a vendor's 
title against a defaulting vendee, the trial court erred in meas-
uring the vendor's damages by the rental value of the property 
while the vendee was in possession instead of by the loss of the 
benefit of the vendor's bargain. 
[3] Id.-Recovery of Damages by Vendor.-On a vendee's default 
in payments, the vendor properly invoked Civ. Code, § 3307, 
affording the vendor the benefit of his bargain. 
[4] Id.-Quieting Title.-A vendor, by seeking to quiet title 
against the defaulting vendee, did not elect to rescind the con-
tract of sale. 
[6] Oontracts-Rescission-Restoration of Benefits.-When a con-
tract is rescinded or declared unenforceable because of the 
statute of frauds, the purpose of damages is to put the parties 
in the position they were in before the contract rather than to 
give either party the benefit of his bargain. . 
[6] Vendor and Purchaser-Rescission-By Purchaser in Default. 
-When a vendee materially breaches his contract, the vendor 
has an election to rescind or to enforce the contract, but the 
defaulting vendee has no such election. 
[7] Id.-Recovery of Damages by Vendor.-Under Civ. Code, 
§ 3307, the value of property to the vendor is ordinarily the 
market value of the property at the date of the defaulting 
purchaser's breach, but this rule necessarily presupposes that 
the vendor is free to use or dispose of the property on that 
date. And where the vendee interferes with the vendor's free-
dom in this respect, by retaining possession or asserting an 
interes* in the property, the vendor may include additional 
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, § 616; Am.Jur., Ven-
dor and Purchaser (1st ed § 524). 
Kclt. Dig. References: [1] Vendor and Purchaser, § 334; [2, 3, 
7] Vendor and Purchaser, § 307; [4] Vendor and Purchaser, 
§ 311; [5] Contracts, § 197; [6] Vendor and Purchaser, § 233; [8] 




802 HONEY V. HENRY'S FRANCHISE LEASING CORP. [64 C.2d 
damages caused thereby in the amount necessary to give him 
the benefit of his bargain. 
[8] Id.-Recovery of Damages by Vendor: Recovery of Purchaser's 
Payments-Amount of Recovery.-In an action by a defaulting 
vendee to rescind the contract of purchase and a cross-action 
by the vendor to quiet title, where the vendor repossessed some 
of the property before trial and there was a question whether 
the value of all the property at the time of trial was equal to 
its value at the time of the vendee's breach plus any consequen-
tial damages that may have occurred, the vendee had the bur-
den to prove any excess of his payments over the amount 
necessary to give the vendor the benefit of his bargain. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Mateo County. Edmund Scott, Judge. Reversed in part with 
directions. 
Action to rescind a contract and to recover money paid; 
cross-action to foreclose a vendor's lien, to recover damages 
and to quiet title to real and pcrsonal property. JUdgment 
quieting title in defendant, upon refunding part of payments, 
reversed with directions to retry the issue of -damages only. 
Heller, . Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, John P. Borgwardt 
and M. Laurence Popofsky for Defendant, Cross-complainant 
and Appellant. 
McCloskey, Wilson, Mosher & Martin, Theodore C. Carl-
strom and Roger L. Mosher for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and 
Respondent. 
John R. Hetland as Amicus Curiae, upon the request of 
Chief Justice Traynor. 
TRA YNOR, C. J.-In March 1962 plaintiff contracted to 
purchase real and personal property from defendant for 
$135,000. He paid $25,000 down and agreed to pay $845 per 
month until the total price was paid. Plaintiff made the 
monthly payments until February 1963. He then brought this 
action to rescind the contract for material misrepresentation of 
fact and to recover what he had paid. Defendant answered and 
cross-complained. It denied that plaintiff was entitled to rescis-
sion and sought to establish and foreclose a vendor's lien, to 
recover damages, and to quiet title. The trial court found that 
there was no basis for rescission and that plaintiff was in 
) 
July 1966] HONEY V. HENRY'S FRANCHISE LEASING CORP. 803 
[64 C.2d 801; 52 Cal.Rptr. 18. 415 P.2d 833J 
default. It entered judgment quieting title in defendant on 
condition that it pay to plaintiff $16,575, the sum found to be 
the difference between the $33,450 plaintiff paid under the 
contract and the rental value ·of the property while it was in 
plaintiff's possession. Defendant appeals, contending that the 
trial court erred in requiring it to refund any of the pay-
ments. 
[1] Even a wilfully defaulting vendee may recover the 
excess of his part payments over the damages caused by his 
breach. (Freedman v. The Rector, 37 Ca1.2d 16, 22-23 [230 
P.2d 629, 31 A.L.R.2d 1] ; see also Caplan v. Schroeder, 56 
Ca1.2d 515, 519 [15 Cal.Rptr. 145, 364 P.2d 321], and cases 
cited.) [2] We agree with defendant's contention that the 
trial court erred in measuring its damages under this rule by 
the rental value of the property while plaintiff was in pos-
session instead of by the loss of the benefit of defendant'8 
bargain. (See Civ. Code, § 3307 .)1 Since the trial court found 
that the fair market value of the property at the time of the 
trial was $90,000, defendant contends that the difference be-
tween the contract price of $135,000 and the fair market value 
of the property exceeded plaintiff's part payments of $33,450. 
The rule of the Freedman case precludes penalties and for-
feitures by denying the vendor the right on the vendee's de-
fault to retain both the property and any payments that have 
been made in excess of the actual damages caused by the de-
fault. The Freedman case, however, did not restrict the right 
of a vendor t6 realize the benefit of his bargain. (See Baffa v. 
Johnson, 35 Ca1.2d 36, 39 [216 P.2d 13] ; Barkis v. Scott, 34 
Ca1.2d 116, 120-121 [208 P.2d 367].) Instead, it invoked the 
provisions of the Civil Code governing damages to determine 
the amount of the vendee's recovery. (37 Ca1.2d at pp. 21-
22.) [3] Since section 3307 affords the vendor the benefit of 
his bargain on the vendee's dcfault, defendant properly in-
vokes it in this case. 
[4] By seeking to quiet title, defendant has not elected to 
rescind the contract. (Barkis v. Scott, 34 Ca1.2d 116, 120-121 
[208 P.2d 367], and cases cited.) [5] When a contract is 
1" The detriment caused by the breach of an agreement to purchase an 
estate in real property, is deemed to be the excess, if any. of the amount 
which would have been due to the seller, under the contract, over the 
value of the property to him." The value of the property to the seller 
is ordinarily the fair market value of the property at the time of the 
breach. (Royer v. Carter, 3i Cal.2d M4, 548·550 [233 P.~d 539]; Baffa 
v. Johnson, 35 Cal.2d 36,39·40 [216 P.2d 131; Employees' Part'icipating 
..ISBn. v. Pine, 91 Cal.App.2d :!U9, 301 [204 P.2tl 965].) 
\ 
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rescinded or declared unenforceable because of the statute of 
frauds, the purpose of damages is to put the parties in the 
position they were in before the contract rather .than to give 
either party the benefit of his bargain. (Heintzsch v. La-
France, 3 Ca1.2d 180, 182-183 [44 P.2d 358] ; Roberts v. Le-
brain, 113 Cal.App.2d 712, 716-717 [248 P.2d 810].) [6] 
When a vendee has materially breached his contract, the ven-
dor has an election to rescind or to enforce the contract. (See 
. Bird v. Kenworthy, 43 Cal.2d 656, 660 [217 P.2d 1] ; Luz v. 
Lopes, 55 Ca1.2d 54, 61 [10 Cal.Rptr. 161, 358 P.2d 289]; 
Behrendt v. Abraham, ante, pp. 182, 188 [49 Cal.Rptr. 292, 
410 P.2d 828].) The defaulting vendee, however, has no such 
election. Otherwise, the contract of sale would in effect be a 
lease with an option to purc]lase. The vendee would receive the 
benefit of any increase in the value of the property, and the 
vendor would bear the entire risk of any decrease in its value. 
Such protection to a defau]ting vendee would go beyond that 
provided by anti-defieiency legis]ation, which places the risk of 
depreciation in value on the vendor only to the extent that the 
"alue of the property may decrease below the amount still 
owing·on the contract. (Code Civ. Proc., § 580b; see Roseleaf 
Corp. v. O1~ierighino, 59 Ca1.2d 35, 42 [27 Cal.Rptr. 873, 378 
P.2d 97].) 
Amicus curiae urges that the remedies for breaches of land-
sale contracts .should be reconsidered in the light of the dis-
tinct purposes such contracts serve. He points out that reme-
dies that are appropriate for the breach of a buy-sell or market-
ing contract may not be appropriate for the breach of an in-
stallment contract entered into primarily as a security device. 
Since rules precluding forfeitures and anti-deficieney legisla-
tion have put the latter type of contracts substantially on a 
par in many respects with mortgages and deeds of trust, ami-
cus curiae suggests that the law governing those security de-
vices should be adopted with appropriate modifications in 
determining the remedies for breaches of installDlent contracts. 
On the vendee's breach, neither the vendee nor the vendor 
would have an election to rescind the contract, on the ground 
that rescission in effeet con\'{'rts a o(>ht S{,C'lll'C'O hythe pron-
erty into a lease of the property, a result. not contemplated by 
either of the parties. In his view, the appropriate remedy is a 
judicia] sale of the property, which will afford the vendor the 
benefit of his bargain to the extent not precluded by the pro. 
hibition against deficiency judgments (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 580b) and return to thc velldee any excess of his part pay-
ments over the damages caused by his breach . 
I 
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In the present case, however, the vendor is not seeking to 
rescind the contract, and neither party seek~ a judicial sale of 
the property to fix damages. Under these circumstances it is 
unnecessary to consider possib)e alternatives to the remedy 
recognized in the Barkis, Baffa, and Freedman cases of quiet-
ing the vendor's title on condition that he refund the excess, 
if any, of the payments received over the amount necessary to 
give him the benefit of his bargain. 
Although the trial court found that the fair market value of 
the property was $90,000 at the time of the trial, we cannot 
conclude that defendant's damages exceeded plaintiff's pay-
ments and that plaintiff is therefore entitled to no recovery. 
[7] Under section 3307 the value of tIle property to the 
seller is ordinarily the market value of the property at the 
date of the breach. (Royer v. Carter, 37 Clil.2d 544, 549-550 
[233 P.2d 539].) This rule necessarily presupposes that the 
vendor is free to use or dispose of the property on tIl at date. 
Accordingly, if the vendee lIas interfered with the vendor's 
freedom in this respect, by retaining possession or asserting an 
interest in the property, the vendor may include any addi-
tional damages caused thereby in the amount necessary to give 
him the benefit of his bargain. (See Royer v. Carter, 37 Cal.2d 
544, 550 [233 P.2d 539].) [8] In the present casc, defend-
ant repossessed some of the property before trial, and it is 
impossible to determine from the record whether the value of 
all of the property at the time of the trial was equal to its 
value at the time of the breach plus any consequential dam-
ages that may have been incurred. On retrial the burden will 
be on plaintiff to prove the excess, if any, of his payments over 
the amount necessary to give defendant the benefit of his bar-
gain. (Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Ca1.2d 36, 39-40 [216 P.2d 13] ; 
Barkis v. Scott, 34 Ca1.2d 116, 120 [208 P.2d 367].) 
No error appears except in the trial court's determination 
of the issue of damages. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed 
with directions to 'retry the issue of damages only and to enter 
the appropriate judgment. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and 
Burke, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied August 
17,1966. 
